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Abstract: The principal aim of this paper is to investigate whether it is possible to create a personality taxonomy of clini-
cal relevance out of Eysenck’s original PEN model by repairing the various shortcomings that can be noted in Eysenck’s 
personality theory, particularly in relation to P or Psychoticism. Addressing three approaches that have been followed to 
answer the question ‘which personality factors are basic?’, arguments are listed to show that particularly the theory-
informed approach, originally defended by Eysenck, may lead to scientific progress. However, also noting the many defi-
ciencies in the nomological network surrounding P, the peculiar situation arises that we adhere to Eysenck’s theory-
informed methodology, but criticize his theory. These arguments and criticisms led to the replacement of P by three or-
thogonal and theory-based factors, Insensitivity (S), Orderliness (G), and Absorption (A), that together with the dimen-
sions E or Extraversion and N or Neuroticism, that were retained from Eysenck’s PEN model, appear to give a compre-
hensive account of the main vulnerability factors in schizophrenia and affective disorders, as well as in other psycho-
pathological conditions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early days of psychiatry, clinicians have specu-
lated about the precise relationships between personality and 
psychopathology. The dominant position has been that per-
sonality forms the background from which psychiatric ill-
nesses emerge rather than the other way round [1]. Accord-
ing to Kraepelin, for instance, aberrant personality traits may 
actually constitute the first expression in infancy of later 
developing dementia praecox/schizophrenia [2], while Sulli-
van claimed that “mental disorder must be regarded as the 
result of the personality relating to the demands of the per-
sonal situation” [3]. Clinical psychologists studying the rela-
tionship between personality and psychopathology have of-
ten shown interest in Eysenck’s PEN model [4]. This is not 
surprising as the proposed dimensions of this model grew 
out of previous attempts by Jung and Kretschmer to link 
their personality schemes to the main types of neurotic and 
psychotic disorder as originally described by Janet and Kra-
epelin (see, e.g., [5,6]). For Eysenck, however, the existence 
of the dimensions Psychoticism (P), Extraversion (E), and 
Neuroticism (N) can only be definitely accepted, provided 
that they also have been deduced from psychological theo-
ries related to findings in learning theory, genetics, physiol-
ogy, perception, psychopharmacology and many other disci-
plines [7-9]. In other words, the clinical dimensions P, E, and 
N can only be described as ‘basic’, ‘major’ or ‘fundamental’ 
[10,11] because of their demonstrated embeddedness – at 
least in the eyes of Eysenck – in a general causative theory 
from which testable deductions were made that could be 
confirmed. Notwithstanding the traditional emphasis here on 
the concept of construct validity (see also [12,13]), Ey- 
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senck’s PEN model has more recently attracted less atten-
tion, mainly because of the now widely held view, both in 
and outside clinical psychology, that with the advent of the 
Big Five [14], FFM [15], and HEXACO models [16], the 
question of which personality factors are basic has been 
definitely settled. Although Eysenck’s E and N factors ap-
pear in these latter models too (together with, for instance, 
the FFM dimensions Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and 
Openness to Experience), the measurement of P was re-
garded to be superseded, because this dimension could not 
be recovered in, for instance, Goldberg’s lexical Big Five 
studies that aimed to identify those factors that represent the 
total personality sphere. Moreover, several authors, among 
them Davis [17], Bishop [18], and Zuckerman, Kuhlman & 
Camac [19], questioned the validity of the P scales con-
structed by Eysenck, because these scales appeared to be 
much stronger related to psychopathy, drug addiction and 
criminality than to psychosis, the area of psychopathology 
that was originally intended to be assessed by these scales. 
Although the lexically-based models undoubtedly will 
be, and have already been, found to correlate with psychopa-
thology [20], these correlations do only reflect content valid-
ity as the personality measures applied in these investiga-
tions could not be validated by using relevant criteria that are 
part of a nomological network in which the various personal-
ity constructs are embedded. Because the Big Five and 
HEXACO dimensions do only rest on factorial studies, it 
comes as no surprise that Eysenck considered his own PEN 
model and the methodology used to arrive at this model to be 
clearly superior. A similar conclusion can be drawn if Ey-
senck’s model is compared with the FFM, for although one 
cannot deny that the FFM dimensions Neuroticism, Extra-
version and Openness to Experience were originally selected 
for more or less theoretical reasons [21], the FFM as cur-
rently understood must be regarded to provide a truly ‘ex-
haustive’ taxonomy of descriptive personality features that 
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fully accords with the results of previous Big Five studies 
[15]. Even later attempts by McCrae and Costa to link their 
dimensions to clinically important theoretical constructs like 
Freud’s narcissism or Horney’s tendency to move against 
people, were only taken in retrospect, that is, after having 
selected the FFM factors because of their similarity with 
Goldberg’s Big Five dimensions [22]. 
The main purpose of the present paper is to look anew at 
Eysenck’s personality model. More specifically, we want to 
investigate whether it is possible to create a personality tax-
onomy of clinical relevance out of the original PEN model 
by repairing the various shortcomings that can be noted in 
Eysenck’s underlying theory, particularly in relation to P or 
Psychoticism. By ‘clinical relevance’ we mean that the tax-
onomy’s dimensions must refer to personality traits that 
make individuals vulnerable to the development of psychiat-
ric disorder, thus upholding the traditional view about the 
nature of the relationship between personality and psychopa-
thology. Additionally, as at least some Axis II personality 
disorders show symptomatic overlap with particular Axis I 
clinical syndromes [23], the intended dimensions may also 
provide a sound basis for improving the classification of 
mental disorders. As such, the present paper addresses a 
timely issue as dimensional models of personality are of 
considerable interest as the field moves toward DSM-V [24].     
The question how to arrive at a set of basic personality 
factors that are of clinical interest will be addressed here by 
applying the same theory-informed methodology as used 
originally by Eysenck in his attempts to demonstrate the 
construct validity of the dimensions P, E, and N. This time, 
however, we will also take into account those theoretical 
data and arguments offered by Eysenck that are not justified. 
As such, attention will be paid to several topics, among 
which Eysenck’s claim that all functional psychoses are ge-
netically related and do not form distinct categories; the the-
ory that psychotic disorders, via a spectrum of non-psychotic 
states (e.g., schizoid disease and criminality), are continuous 
with normal behavior; and Eysenck’s belief that his EPQ-P 
scale [25] actually measures Psychoticism, notwithstanding 
its antisocial and psychopathic contents. As, however, not 
only Eysenck’s PEN model, but also the Big Five, FFM and 
HEXACO models all claim to embrace basic dimensions of 
personality, we will not simply stick to Eysenck’s assertion 
that only his own methodology can be trusted, and that the 
statistical approach advocated, for instance, by Goldberg 
leads at best to arbitrary results [10,11]. Rather, we want to 
compare these different methodologies, looking for their 
relative strengths and weaknesses. As the choice of a certain 
methodology always precedes the establishment of a particu-
lar model, we will first present such a comparison (also in-
cluding the so-called heuristic approach; see below), whereas 
Eysenck’s P theory and the clinical taxonomy we propose 
instead of Eysenck’s PEN model are discussed in the sec-
tions that follow.   
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
One of the main debates in personality psychology in the 
last decennium of the 20th century concerned the question 
‘which personality factors are basic?’ and ‘what are the crite-
ria to determine that a personality factor is basic?’ [10, 11, 
22, 26-28]. According to Eysenck [10], three approaches 
have been followed to address these questions: (1) the ‘heu-
ristic’ approach, (2) the approach advocated by Cattell and 
by the Big Five proponents (and later by the designers of the 
HEXACO model), and (3) the theory-informed approach 
followed by Eysenck himself. 
Heuristic Trait Models 
In Eysenck’s view, heuristic personality psychologists 
follow ‘a pre-conceived notion of what traits might be im-
portant, or indeed what traits might or might not exist, or 
else (…) adopt some psychiatric system of classification’ 
[10]. The ensuing models are sometimes criticized by Ey-
senck because of their psychometric inadequacies. However, 
these criticisms are not held to be of great importance, for 
Eysenck admits that some heuristic inventories may have 
‘reasonable psychometric parentage’ [26]. Of more impor-
tance, then, is Eysenck’s second point of criticism, according 
to which heuristic traits are ‘not based on any theory of per-
sonality’ [26], or – the other way round – are considered to 
be ‘of little value for the creation of a proper scientific model 
of personality’ [10]. What is meant by these statements 
might be inferred from a letter from Eysenck to Goldberg 
(February 27, 1995) that formed part of an ongoing discus-
sion between the two authors about methodology and the 
place of theory and construct validity in personality psychol-
ogy. In this letter – kindly made available to the present 
author by Goldberg1 (Personal communication, March 13, 
1995) – Eysenck asserts that many so-called theories, such as 
those of Millon, Block, Bakan, and Tellegen, ‘are essentially 
taxonomic’, and, thus, that ‘they do not begin to touch the 
root of the problem as not being “theories” in my sense at 
all. Notions begin to become theories when they leave the 
purely taxonomic field and incorporate testable causal as-
sumptions’.  
The Psychometric Approach 
The second group of personality psychologists – Cattell 
and the proponents of the Big Five model – consists, accord-
ing to Eysenck, ‘of those who adopt a psychometric point of 
view, and would like to base their model of personality on 
complex factorial studies of the intercorrelations between 
traits’ [10]. As is well-known, this characterization is obvi-
ously onesided, for, besides statistical arguments, the per-
sonality psychologists adhering to this position also defend 
their trait models on the basis of the lexical hypothesis. In 
fact, this hypothesis must be seen to offer the ultimate foun-
dation behind this approach, whereas the use of factor analy-
sis and other statistical techniques may be seen as merely 
auxiliary. However, for the moment, we will follow Eysenck 
in his discourse, which means that the lexical hypothesis will 
be mentioned only obliquely or not at all.  
Compared with Eysenck’s treatment of heuristic person-
ality models, the work of the followers of the ‘psychometric 
approach’ is usually addressed more favorably by him. Re-
garding their respective contributions, the results are said to 
be ‘replicable (…) and there is considerable agreement be-
                                                
1 Three letters are involved in this exchange of ideas: two from Eysenck to 
Goldberg (January 11, 1995; February 27, 1995) and one from Goldberg to 
Eysenck (February 6, 1995). For the sake of interest, or to elucidate a spe-
cific point, we will sometimes quote from these letters.  
Personality and Psychopathology Clinical Practice & Epidemiology in Mental Health, 2009, Volume 5    11 
tween leading exponents’ [10]. Moreover, the differences 
between Cattell’s 16 PF system and the Big Five model are 
believed to be ‘only apparent’, for the 16 dimensions pro-
posed by Cattell (which must be seen as primary factors) 
have been found in factor analytic investigations to result in 
‘a much smaller number of factors similar to those advocated 
by Eysenck and by the “Big Five” proponents’ [10]. A less 
favorable view with respect to Cattell’s model seems appar-
ent in Eysenck’s 1991 discussion of the present topic [26]. It 
might be true, states Eysenck, that Cattell has tried ‘to cover 
the whole ground of personality – collecting relevant linguis-
tic terms’, the fact remains that the 16PF system in factor 
analytic studies fails to replicate. Similar criticisms can also 
be found in another paper by Eysenck, even to the point of 
classifying Cattell’s model under the category of heuristic 
personality models because of its psychometric weaknesses 
[11].  
The relatively benevolent view of Eysenck on the Big 
Five model has also its limits. A particularly weighty point 
for Eysenck with this model is that although the Big Five 
dimensions (or their non-lexical counterparts proposed by 
Costa & McCrae [15]) seem to be well established, these 
factors actually refer to a mix of two second-order factors, 
namely, Extraversion (E) and Neuroticism (N), and three 
first-order dimensions, viz., Agreeableness, Openess to Ex-
perience, and Conscientiousness [26]2. Support for this view 
is borrowed from a study by McCrae & Costa, in which it 
was demonstrated that Agreeableness (A) and Conscien-
tiousness (C) were both (negatively) correlated with Ey-
senck’s P or Psychoticism dimension [30]. Hence, it seemed 
possible to regard the two Big Five factors as subfactors of 
P. The same mixture of second- and first-order dimensions is 
also described in Eysenck’s 1994a and 1994b publications 
[10,11], in which mention is made of Goldberg & Rosol-
ack’s finding that A and C, when disattenuated, correlate -
0.85 with P [28]. With these relationships, Eysenck obvi-
ously arrives at his ‘own’ personality dimensions P, E, and 
N, making his PEN model a serious alternative compared 
with the Big Five system. A similar conclusion would almost 
certainly have been reached by Eysenck regarding Ashton’s 
Big Six representation [31]. In that case, the HEXACO fac-
tors H (Honesty), A (Agreeableness), and C (Conscientious-
ness) would very likely have been regarded to negatively 
correlate with P.    
Eysenck’s Theoretical Approach 
The above-cited finding that A and C both correlate with 
P is for Eysenck insufficient reason to discard the two Big 
Five dimensions. Indeed, instead of concluding that A and C 
must be regarded as subfactors of P, we may also arrive at 
Costa & McCrae’s [22] contention that P ‘is a mere artifact, 
combining variance from A and C’ [11]. So, the problem 
arises how to choose between these alternative positions.  
                                                
2 Ironically, Eysenck’s criticisms with respect to the different hierarchical 
status of the Big Five dimensions also apply to his own model. According to 
recent research by Markon et al., P and N might be considered  first-order 
dimensions of Alpha, as compared to the second-order status of Beta, which 
mainly resembles E [29]. However, with the dimensions Extraversion and 
Neuroticism emerging at several levels in Markon et al’s scheme, the criti-
cisms leveled by Eysenck are only valid in the case of a three-factor solu-
tion.         
It is here that Eysenck introduces his own methodology 
for answering the question ‘which personality factors are 
basic?’ Factor analysis alone, states Eysenck, ‘is too narrow 
a base from which to construct an adequate model’ [10]. A 
solution should be arrived at in the combination of the two 
traditional disciplines in scientific psychology: the experi-
mental and the correlational discipline. More specifically, the 
correlational approach in personality psychology must be 
grounded in a general theory or nomological network that 
permits experimental testing. Far more important than the 
criteria of factor replicability and the existence of higher-
order factors that are similar to the dimensions P, E, and N, 
Eysenck insists that ‘In order to qualify as a major dimension 
of personality, any concept should be based on a general 
theory which has its antecedents in DNA (genetic analysis), 
and advances through biological intermediaries (psycho-
physiological, hormonal, etc.) to the dimensional and facto-
rial analysis of behaviour and trait patterns. It should from 
there proceed to the experimental testing of the general the-
ory, making deductions from the theory as to how people at 
various positions on the relevant personality dimensions 
would behave in carefully designed experimental situations. 
And finally one would expect that the theory, and the knowl-
edge acquired through experimental study, should enable us 
to make predictions as to the general social behaviour of 
people in carefully defined situations. If the theory can ac-
complish that, then it might be used to define a dimension of 
personality which would have paradigmatic standing’ [10]3.  
Comprehensive Basic Factors 
Prior to describing the clinical nomological network that 
according to Eysenck naturally leads to the conclusion that P 
is a basic dimension of personality, two other points must be 
dealt with concerning Eysenck’s view that only his theory-
informed approach may give a valid answer to the question 
as to which personality factors are basic: (1) the position of 
the adherents of the Big Five model with respect to that 
question, and (2) the objections they raise against Eysenck’s 
claim that the Big Five and heuristic approaches in personal-
ity psychology are opposed to the ‘theoretical’ approach. As 
we will see, both issues may slightly weaken Eysenck’s posi-
tion in that the heuristic and phenotypic structure approaches 
comprise some elements that cannot be discarded, but never-
theless do not provide enough power to simply replace Ey-
senck’s methodology. 
In criticizing the Big Five model as a system of personal-
ity description that almost completely relies on psychometric 
and factor analytic studies, Eysenck failed to recognize the 
much greater importance attributed by their advocates – and 
by Cattell – to the lexical hypothesis. This hypothesis states 
that ‘all aspects of human personality which are or have been 
of importance, interest, or utility have already become re-
corded in the substance of language’ [36]. Goldberg explains 
                                                
3 As about fifty percent of the variance of personality traits derives from 
unshared environmental influences (see, e.g., [32]), the emphasis here on 
genetic and biological factors in defining a basic dimension of personality is 
clearly one-sided. Personality traits are actually an amalgam of behavioral 
dispositions present at birth (temperament) and life experiences [33], the 
latter probably mainly extra-familial [34]. From the perspective of psycho-
pathology, we must also state that genetic vulnerabilities may never become 
apparent unless uncovered by specific environmental conditions [35].          
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this phenomenon by arguing ‘that the more important [an 
individual] difference is, the more people will notice it and 
wish to talk of it, with the result that eventually they will 
invent a word for it’ [37]. Of course, in defending his own 
PEN model, Eysenck rightfully rejects the notion that this 
hypothesis has anything to do with psychological theory, as 
the lexical approach is only acquainted with language [10]. 
Other psychologists, like Allport and Block, though in Ey-
senck’s view merely following the heuristic approach, un-
derscore this position by noting that ‘common speech is a 
poor guide to psychological subtleties’ [38] and ‘that, for 
scientific purposes, single-word descriptors (…) cannot con-
vey crucial features of personality [and] its dynamic func-
tioning’ [39]. Nevertheless, the linguistic approach has some 
advantages, to which Eysenck seems almost completely un-
aware. Instead of claiming that a basic personality factor 
must have been shown to form part of a tested nomological 
network, the lexical approach has an open eye for the 
comprehensiveness of one or more dimensions. As noticed 
by Costa & McCrae, ‘Insuring that a personality system 
[such as the one proposed by Eysenck] includes all major 
domains of personality is problematic because there is no 
conclusive way to know that some set of traits has not been 
overlooked’ [15]. However, embracing the lexical hypothe-
sis, we are in the position to argue that the establishment of a 
truly ‘exhaustive’ taxonomy of personality features could 
proceed from a thorough examination (by means of synonym 
ratings, cluster analysis, and factor analysis) of all personal-
ity-descriptive terms contained in an unabridged dictionary. 
Hence, the basic character of a lexically-based personality 
dimension does not lie in the incorporation of a proper causal 
theory, but in the demonstration that that dimension accounts 
for a rather large part of total ‘personality sphere’ variance, 
which is represented by an essentially finite number of lin-
guistic terms. What we thus see is that the linguistic hy-
pothesis is said to offer an adequate procedure for sampling 
human traits, whereas cluster analysis and factor analysis are 
used as a method for structuring that sample of attributes 
[21].  
Although several problems remain, particularly associ-
ated with the possibility of dimensions that exist beyond the 
Big Five, most results obtained in lexical personality studies, 
at least in Western industrialized countries, have been found 
to support the Big Five taxonomy, or at least a model that is 
more or less similar to that taxonomy. According to a study 
by Ashton et al., for instance, a cross-language six-factor 
solution appears appropriate, of which five factors are not 
greatly different from the Big Five dimensions Surgency, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability and 
Intellect [31]. It is from this demonstrated capacity that the 
Big Five model, in our opinion, might profitably be used as a 
yardstick to measure the degree to which heuristic or theory-
informed personality dimensions are ‘exhaustive’ by corre-
lating these dimensions with the Big Five factors. Of course, 
the HEXACO model might also be selected for that purpose. 
Nevertheless, we must not forget that a basic dimension in 
the sense of Eysenck does not necessarily mean the demon-
stration of exhaustiveness, or vice versa. A basic dimension 
as understood by Eysenck may for instance be found to cor-
relate with several Big Five factors, or only with a subdo-
main of personality characteristics associated with one of the 
lexical dimensions. Hence, we must conclude that when Ey-
senck and the adherents of the phenotypic structure approach 
speak about basic personality dimensions, they mean some-
thing completely different4.      
Inadequate Demarcations 
The second issue that must be discussed relates to the 
fact that Eysenck’s [10] distinction between the heuristic, the 
Big Five, and his own theoretical approach is believed by the 
adherents of the Big Five model to give a rather false im-
pression of the real demarcation lines in personality psychol-
ogy. Eysenck’s notion that the lexical approach is only con-
cerned with a descriptive taxonomy of phenotypic personal-
ity features leaves two points out of consideration, namely 
(1) that the adherents of the Big Five model actually share 
this notion, and (2) that they hold that in science it has been 
often found useful, if not necessary, to develop a descriptive 
taxonomy prior to the establishment of a general causative 
theory [21].  
With respect to the latter point, we must first reiterate 
that in Eysenck’s approach the introduction of a personality 
dimension is closely related to the formulation of a psycho-
logical theory in which that dimension is embedded. This 
view is reminiscent of Eysenck’s [40] definition of a theory 
as a nomological network, which in turn is defined as ‘an 
interlocking system of lawful relations’, consisting of ‘both 
theoretical constructs and observable properties or opera-
tions’ (see for a slightly different exposition: [41]). Thus, in 
the case of Eysenck’s P theory, the statement that schizo-
phrenia and manic-depressive illness are genetically related 
(see below) will naturally lead to the investigation of the 
genetic background of P, for this dimension – at least as 
measured by the P scale of the Eysenck Personality Ques-
tionnaire [25] – was introduced to represent the genetic pre-
disposition towards both psychoses. In contrast, no deduc-
tions can be made from whatever causal theory if we want to 
investigate the genetics of the Big Five dimensions Agree-
ableness and Conscientiousness, as these dimensions are 
only based on lexical studies. An even better example (also 
discussed below) is the testing of Eysenck’s P theory by 
means of proportionality analysis, for the application of this 
method is indeed unthinkable in the case of the merely lexi-
cally and statistically derived dimensions just mentioned. 
Acknowledging then that the eventual formation of a causal 
theory after the establishment of a purely descriptive and 
lexically-based taxonomy remains possible, we have to con-
clude that Eysenck’s approach has the great advantage to 
postulate dimensions that have led to the formation of a psy-
chological theory from which testable hypotheses can be 
deduced – a theory that also gives direct psychological 
meaning to the positions obtained on these dimensions. 
One further point related to the question whether it seems 
wise to develop a merely descriptive taxonomy prior to the 
establishment of a causal theory has also to do with this con-
clusion. For in Eysenck’s opinion, his own approach must 
                                                
4 This is not to say that Eysenck sees no merit in exhaustive dimensions. At 
least on some occasions, Eysenck has defined the concept of ‘basicality’ to 
also include the notion that fundamental factors offer a comprehensive 
account of man’s interpersonal conduct (see, e.g., [26] and Eysenck’s letter 
to Goldberg from February 27, 1995).    
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not only be regarded as fundamentally different from the 
lexical methodology, but also from the approach followed by 
the adherents of the heuristic school [10]. Of course, in em-
phasizing that a basic personality dimension must be embed-
ded in a nomological network, the separate place of the heu-
ristic approach is justified. However, if we ask for the ori-
gins of Eysenck’s PEN model, this distinction becomes 
blurred, because, as Goldberg writes in his letter to Eysenck 
(February 6, 1995), ‘it is not clear to the world at large how 
your PEN model is not well described as an example of the 
“heuristic” school, given that you explicitly adopted “some 
psychiatric system of classification” for P and N, and you 
used your own “notion of what traits might be important” to 
select E’. Therefore, instead of emphasizing the differences 
between Eysenck’s methodology and the heuristic approach, 
pre-theoretical notions may be seen as actually constituting a 
necessary first step in the development of a causal theory 
along the lines advocated by Eysenck. Hence, Eysenck’s 
assertion in his letter to Goldberg (February 27, 1995) that 
the theories of Millon, Block, Bakan, and Tellegen, as well 
as those of Cattell, Gough, Comrey and Guilford, are ‘purely 
descriptive’, and consequently ‘all on a different planet to a 
proper causal theory’, may be correct in so far as these 
authors have not presented any genetic, physiological, ex-
perimental or social-psychological evidence in support for 
their views, but the placement of all these ‘theories’ in a 
separate category of heuristic trait models misses the point 
that at least some of these views may grow into well-
validated theories in the sense of Eysenck. Indeed, the sug-
gestion often made by Eysenck (see, e.g., [10,11]) that it is 
actually only his PEN model that offers an answer to the 
question which personality dimensions are basic must be 
criticized as well, for, as Eysenck recently conceded, other 
psychologists, like Gray, Cloninger and Zuckerman, have 
also ‘developed a nomological network making testable pre-
dictions of the kind here considered’ [41]. In the present pa-
per, however, we will only critically discuss the theory be-
hind Eysenck’s PEN model (in fact only the theory behind P, 
for it is especially the ‘P part’ of the model that contains ele-
ments that run counter to empirical fact) as we consider 
Eysenck’s heuristic notion that the main diagnostic catego-
ries in psychiatry must somehow relate to the main dimen-
sions of personality a suitable (but, of course, debatable) 
starting-point. Naturally, it is particularly in clinical psy-
chology – the field of study of Eysenck and the present 
author – that such a notion makes sense; in non-clinical per-
sonality psychology, other pre-theoretical notions may be 
more relevant. Therefore, to sum up our methodological po-
sition, we have to conclude that from the three approaches 
listed by Eysenck for deciding on the constructs to be used in 
personality psychology [10], particularly Eysenck’s theory-
informed approach can be expected to deepen our psycho-
logical understanding and to lead to progress in personality 
science, but that nevertheless heuristic notions, based on, for 
instance, intuition and observation, play a very important 
role in at least provisionally selecting the dimensions of in-
terest. The lexical approach, although wholly appropriate if 
comprehensive personality factors are at stake, is unsuitable 
if our intention is to delineate specific personality dimen-
sions that are embedded in a causal theory that has the ability 
to generate testable deductions. Hence, designed for different 
purposes, the lexical approach and the theory-informed 
methodology do not appear to exclude each other, making it 
almost unbelievable that both Eysenck and the adherents of 
the lexical approach often spoke of a ‘seemingly intractable 
controversy’ in need of ‘a convincing solution’ (see, e.g., 
[42]). 
EYSENCK’S P THEORY 
Two Presuppositions About P 
Compared with Eysenck’s E and N theories that are ex-
tensively investigated along biological and experimental 
psychological lines [8], Eysenck’s P theory seems to be 
rather meagre. However, there are two presuppositions about 
P that Eysenck believes are well supported and that, hence, 
suggest that the Psychoticism model might at least be correct 
in broad outline. According to Eysenck, the first proposition 
states ‘that all functional psychoses (schizophrenia, manic-
depressive illness, schizoaffective disorders, monopolar de-
pression) are related and do not form independent catego-
ries’ [27]. Elsewhere, this presupposition is worded some-
what differently by stating that these illnesses ‘form a defi-
nite continuum’ from the least severe to the most severe 
[43], or that these illnesses ‘have some fundamental psycho-
logical property in common’ [11]. Eysenck’s second presup-
position is ‘that psychoses as such are continuous with a 
whole spectrum of abnormal states (schizoid disorders, psy-
chopathy, alcoholism, criminality) which occur significantly 
more frequently in relatives of psychotics, and shade into 
perfectly normal forms of behaviour’ [27]. The common 
property of the psychoses, therefore, is not held to be ‘cate-
gorical or qualitative, opposing psychotic to normal, but is 
dimensional or continuous, going from one extreme (psycho-
sis) to its opposite’ [11].  
Although only marginally distinguished by Eysenck (see, 
e.g., [9]), there are actually two versions of each presupposi-
tion, associated with what we have elsewhere called the phe-
notypic and the genotypic P models [44]. This pairing is 
reminiscent of Andreasen’s more global distinction between 
the phenomenotype (e.g., symptomatology) and the biotype 
(e.g., genetics and neurophysiology) in psychopathology – 
two different fields of study that must be integrated if we 
want to identify and define a certain disorder [45]. However, 
as we discuss below, the phenotypic and the genotypic P 
models appear to be impossible to reconcile. 
Common Symptoms 
In the phenotypic variant of the first presupposition the 
common psychological property is simply defined as the 
symptomatic overlap of the various psychoses, particularly 
emphasizing the presence of psychotic symptoms, like hallu-
cinations and delusions. Such a definition is hardly surpris-
ing, as it is precisely the fact that for disorders such as 
schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis to be called 
‘psychotic’, they must have at least these symptoms in com-
mon which distinguish them from all other disorders.  
Common Genetics  
Compared with the phenotypic variant, the genotypic 
variant of the first presupposition appears to be more prob-
lematic. Instead of merely assuming a symptomatic relation-
ship, schizophrenia and manic-depression, as well as other 
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psychoses, are now believed to be caused by a common ge-
netic defect. Furthermore, this common factor is also be-
lieved to underlie the emergence of several non-psychotic 
manifestations, in particular psychopathy, antisocial conduct, 
criminality and ‘schizoidia’ (e.g., schizotypal personality 
disorder), as these manifestations have been found, accord-
ing to Eysenck, to occur rather frequently among biological 
relatives of schizophrenic and manic-depressive patients.  
As to the psychoses, several studies are mentioned by 
Eysenck [9,46], which according to him demonstrate that 
schizophrenia, manic-depression and other psychoses, al-
though also showing some degree of biological specificity, 
are genetically related. However, as indicated elsewhere 
[44,47], most of the empirical evidence actually points in a 
direction opposite to Eysenck’s theory (see, e.g., [48]), albeit 
that that the relative risk for unipolar depression (but not for 
bipolar disorder, the condition most similar to manic-
depressive insanity) perhaps might be slightly increased in 
first-degree biological relatives of schizophrenic probands 
[49]. Of course, there are recent linkage studies that suggest 
that schizophrenia and manic-depression share some suscep-
tibility genes [50], but if these syndromes are defined as 
usual on the basis of a lifetime diagnostic hierarchy with 
schizophrenia at the top and bipolar disorder at a lower posi-
tion, quantitative genetic studies have generally not demon-
strated significant familial co-aggregation [51]. Moreover, a 
relaxation of that hierarchy – permitting, for instance, the 
recognition of mania as a separate disorder in the presence 
of typical schizophrenia – must be criticized, for it is known 
that the decompensation process in schizophrenia includes 
the occurrence of manic- and depressive-like symptoms 
[52,53]. With respect to other forms of psychosis (for in-
stance, delusional and schizo-affective disorder), a genetic 
relationship with schizophrenia cannot be excluded [54], but 
these relationships hardly carry any weight here, as at least 
some of these conditions may simply be subsumed under the 
category of schizophrenic disorders, because the boundaries 
of the schizophrenia concept are still unclear [55]. 
The criticisms that can be leveled at Eysenck’s non-
psychotic extension of the genetic generality hypothesis have 
also been previously discussed [44]. Besides the fact that 
only studies are mentioned that examined relatives of 
schizophrenics, and not relatives of patients with affective or 
other psychoses, the main criticism here relates to Eysenck’s 
suggestion that all forms of psychopathy and antisocial con-
duct belong to the schizophrenia spectrum. This view, how-
ever, must be refuted as the genetic relationship concerns 
only the schizoid form of psychopathy that was originally 
described by Kallmann [56]. Nevertheless, we must not for-
get that several behaviors present in schizoid psychopathic 
individuals also occur among persons with classical psycho-
pathy. If psychopathy is defined in terms of Cooke & Mi-
chie’s three-factor model [57], schizoid and classical psy-
chopathy seem to have the ‘affective style’ and ‘behavioral 
style’ factors in common, but the schizoid form does not 
appear to be characterized by high scores on the ‘interper-
sonal’ factor. Replacing the older designation ‘schizoid’ by 
the more precise term ‘schizotypal’, a similar correction has 
to be made. Although we must confirm the place attributed 
by Eysenck of schizotypal personality disorder (and perhaps 
also of paranoid personality disorder) in the schizophrenia 
spectrum (see, e.g., [54]), it is important to note that these 
‘official’ diagnostic categories do not seem to exhaust the 
many subtleties present in former descriptions of schizoid 
personality deviations found among biological relatives of 
schizophrenics [58,59]. Furthermore, these modern catego-
ries may be too ‘broad’ from a genetic perspective, as only 
‘negative’ schizotypic features (like social anxiety and affec-
tive flattening), and not ‘positive’ or psychotic-like symp-
toms, are found to be more common among the relatives of 
schizophrenic probands [60].  
The Normality-Psychosis Continuum 
The phenotypic version of the second presupposition was 
initially put forward by Eysenck in 1952 [61]. At that time, 
Eysenck regarded P as ‘a continuum which goes all the way 
from the perfectly normal, rational to the completely insane, 
psychotic individual’. The same view was echoed again in 
1976, when Eysenck & Eysenck wrote that ‘the characteris-
tics which differentiate normals from psychotics are infi-
nitely graded, giving rise to all sorts of intermediate person-
alities from one extreme to the other’ [6]. Although Eysenck 
[61] claims that the continuity hypothesis with regard to psy-
chotic behavior has actually been verified by him, this claim 
is not justified, as the here demonstrated continuity does not 
reflect psychosis, but only the nature of the objective tests 
that were applied in Eysenck’s study [44,62].  
Nevertheless, there are other indications that offer sup-
port for some form of phenotypic continuity. We may, for 
instance, point to several studies discussed by Johns & Van 
Os [63] in which it was demonstrated that both hallucinatory 
and delusion-like experiences are present in considerable 
proportions in normal samples. Also of interest is the find-
ing, discussed by, for instance, Vollema & Van den Bosch 
[64], that specific scales, constructed to measure psychotic-
like symptoms in non-clinical samples define a factor of 
positive schizotypy (see, e.g., [65]) that appeared to be strik-
ingly similar to one of the dimensions found in factor ana-
lytic studies of schizophrenic symptoms (e.g., [66]). Of 
course, the aforementioned continuity only concerns posi-
tions on Eysenck’s normality-psychosis continuum that are 
more or less strongly associated with the psychotic extreme. 
Nowhere is a reference made to qualities that describe ‘the 
perfectly normal, rational individual’. Although some form 
of discontinuity, which shows itself in a threshold effect, 
might also exist [67], this ‘continuum-related discontinuity’ 
effect has not been demonstrated convincingly, and, thus, we 
may still adhere to Eysenck’s phenotypic conceptualization 
of a normality-psychosis continuum without any qualitative 
distinction [9].  
P as a Genetic Predisposition Factor 
In the genotypic version of the second presupposition, P 
relates to a diathesis-stress theory of psychotic disorder, in 
which the genetic influences believed to cause the develop-
ment of both schizophrenia and manic-depression (and also 
of other psychoses and non-psychotic conditions, like psy-
chopathy and criminality) are assumed to be constituted of 
genes of small value whose effects are additive [6]. In this 
version of the model, the degree of Psychoticism is held to 
be determined by the number of active genes involved, as 
well as by environmental factors. In addition, the model pos-
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tulates one or more large effect genes that, if present, will 
produce the sort of ‘classical’ psychoses recognized by Kra-
epelin, or – more likely in Eysenck’s view – ‘a large number 
of more sharply delineated categories normally subsumed 
within these great groups of psychotic disorder’ [6]. How-
ever, in most cases, the genes of large effect are believed to 
be absent, illustrating the importance attributed to P as a 
general factor and Eysenck’s claim that schizophrenia and 
manic-depression have much in common, both phenotypi-
cally and genotypically. With this polygenic view, the asso-
ciated P scale is defined as ‘a phenotypic measure of the 
hypothetical genetic predisposition towards psychotic behav-
iour’ [68], also claiming, of course, that the same predisposi-
tion extends ‘into the psychopathic and criminal, antisocial 
field, but not into that of the dysthymic neuroses’ [46].  
The interpretation of P as an unspecific vulnerability fac-
tor with respect to psychosis is clearly at variance with Ey-
senck’s original and phenotypic conceptualization of that 
dimension. Whereas a high position on P in the phenotypic 
model is indicative of the presence of psychotic features, a 
high P score in the genotypic model is only related to a 
greater chance of being affected by a psychotic illness. Oc-
casionally, this is pointed out by Eysenck himself. Thus Ey-
senck & Eysenck [25] state that a high (genotypic) P score 
‘is a far cry from actual psychosis, and only a very small 
proportion of people with high P scores are likely to develop 
psychosis in the course of their lives’. Hence, it is rather pe-
culiar that on other occasions these very different continua 
have been regarded as one and the same dimension (e.g., 
[9]). The distinction between both conceptualizations also 
becomes apparent if we compare Eysenck’s original P scale 
[69] with the one – the P scale of the EPQ – finally arrived 
at. Although not fully representative of the phenotypic ap-
proach, the initial P scale contains several items that seem at 
face value to measure psychotic-like features [70], whereas 
these features are not mentioned in the contents of the EPQ P 
scale, a scale that completely adheres to the genotypic 
model. This agrees with the observation that the original P 
scale turns out to correlate very low (r = 0.19) with the P 
scale of the EPQ [71]. 
At least partly due to Eysenck’s mixing up of his pheno-
typic and genotypic insights, the EPQ P scale has often been 
uncritically criticized for its contents. It is particularly the 
fact that many items in the EPQ P scale relate to such fea-
tures as callousness, impulsivity, and egocentricity that has 
proved to most critics – sticking in effect to Eysenck’s phe-
notypic conceptualization – that the EPQ P scale could not 
be regarded a valid measure of psychoticism (see, e.g., [19]). 
A related criticism concerns the observation that, on this 
scale, schizophrenic patients show only slightly raised scores 
[72], whereas high P scores have been found in criminals 
and other individuals with socially deviant behavior, includ-
ing, for instance, violent people and drug addicts [9]. How-
ever, for Eysenck, the latter findings actually count in favor 
of the validity of the EPQ P scale, as in his view socially 
deviant behavior is based on the same genotype as schizo-
phrenia and other psychoses. Although this common geno-
type does not exist, the above-mentioned genetic link be-
tween schizophrenia and ‘affective style’ and ‘behavioral 
style’ ingredients of psychopathy illustrates that Eysenck’s 
view is not completely mistaken. Moreover, the validity of 
the EPQ P scale seems indicated by the fact that the scale, as 
regards content, agrees well with former descriptions of the 
schizoid personality, which may not only be present among 
biological relatives of schizophrenics, but may also be ob-
served prior to schizophrenic breakdown [73]. It is this psy-
chopathic content that makes the EPQ P scale a measure of 
those personality characteristics that are elsewhere described 
as defining the schizotypy factor Impulsive Nonconformity 
[74] or Asocial Schizotypy [53,75], and not a measure of 
those features associated with the remaining schizotypy fac-
tors Positive Schizotypy, Negative Schizotypy, and Cogni-
tive Disorganization. Given this limitation, it seems not only 
appropriate to replace the usual idea of one single, unobserv-
able, and continuously distributed variable termed liability or 
predisposition to schizophrenia [76] by a model in which 
three [75] or four [74] vulnerability factors operate, but also 
to redefine Eysenck’s EPQ P dimension as a factor that only 
accounts for the emergence of antisocial conduct, both in 
prodromal and full-blown schizophrenia, and also in schizoid 
disease [75].  
Admitting, then, that at least some psychopathic features 
are rightly assessed by the EPQ P scale, it must also be noted 
that these features are not the only characteristics that typify 
the contents of that scale. Several items, when scored in the 
direction opposite to the scale key, appear to indicate the 
presence of traits like carefulness, cleanliness, and punctual-
ity that are often denoted in the clinical literature as features 
that may precede the onset of unipolar or major depression, 
and possibly also of bipolar disorder [47]. Hence, it appears 
that Eysenck’s EPQ P dimension is actually built up of two 
subfactors that refer, respectively, to the ‘antisocial’ compo-
nent of the pre-schizophrenic personality and to a cluster of 
personality traits that may precede the onset of unipolar de-
pression. The two-components view on P agrees with a fac-
tor analytic study conducted by Roger & Morris [77] in 
which it was demonstrated that the EPQ P dimension breaks 
down into two subfactors: a factor primarily concerned with 
‘callousness, suspiciousness, intolerance and self-serving 
attitudes’ and a factor that, if reversed, is associated with 
‘punctuality, orderliness, and caution’. 
Proportionality Analysis 
To prove that the label Psychoticism literally applies to 
the EPQ P scale, we have to demonstrate, according to Ey-
senck, that the same biological and other variables that dis-
criminate between psychotics and normals are also capable 
to discriminate between high P and low P scorers. It is this 
demonstration – executed by means of proportionality analy-
sis – that in Eysenck’s view is most closely connected with 
the application of the theory-informed approach in personal-
ity psychology. Noting that several variables – and particu-
larly those selected for their relationship with putatively fun-
damental processes occurring in psychotic patients (among 
them low platelet MAO activity and SPEM dysfunction) – 
showed the expected effects, Eysenck concluded that ‘it 
would seem difficult to account for these findings on 
grounds other than the admission of a continuum ranging 
from the normal to the psychotic, with gradings both within 
the normal and the psychotic portion’ [9]. However, as Ey-
senck’s conclusion already hints at, the phenotypic and the 
genotypic P models are again mixed up, because the pheno-
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typic continuum hypothesis is said to be supported by pro-
portional effects that include high and low scores on a vul-
nerability scale that only measures the probability of being 
affected by psychotic illness. A further complication stems 
from the fact that the variables subjected to proportionality 
analysis have nearly always been found to only discriminate 
schizophrenic patients from normals, and, so – even apart 
from Eysenck’s unjustified claim that the methodology of 
proportional effect has actually demonstrated the existence 
of a phenotypic continuum – it seems better to speak of a 
continuum spanning the bridge between normality and 
schizophrenia. Still better, an interpretation of the propor-
tionality findings may be preferred which takes account of 
the fact that several variables that originally were found to 
discriminate between schizophrenics and normals were also 
found to make a distinction between biological relatives of 
schizophrenics and normals (see, e.g., [78]). From this per-
spective, these variables may actually be seen as markers of 
the genetic vulnerability to schizophrenia. The demonstrated 
proportionality effects may thus offer a strong indication that 
Eysenck’s EPQ P scale might be considered a phenotypic 
measure of the hypothetical genetic predisposition towards 
(only) schizophrenia and schizophrenic spectrum disorders. 
As the EPQ P scale is at least in part a measure of Asocial 
Schizotypy (see above), the meaning of this scale must be 
further curtailed by stating that the genetic predisposition 
represented by this scale only accounts for the emergence of 
the above-mentioned schizoid manifestations of psycho-
pathic behavior in patients suffering from schizophrenia and 
schizophrenic spectrum disorders. It is from this perspective, 
that we may also criticize Eysenck’s [9] contention that the 
demonstrated relationship between low Extraversion and 
high Neuroticism, on the one hand, and the schizotypy fac-
tors Negative Schizotypy and Cognitive Disorganization, on 
the other [74], simply indicates that most schizotypy scales, 
‘in view of the genetic distinctiveness of neurotic and psy-
chotic disorders’, are obviously unsound and that only EPQ 
P measures Psychoticism. Given the above, a completely 
different picture emerges, according to which the premorbid 
personality of later schizophrenic patients is not only charac-
terized by schizoid psychopathic features (P), but also by 
low E and high N characteristics. These latter characteristics 
are also recognized in the clinical literature in the form of, 
for instance, social withdrawal, tension, and oversensitive 
behavior (see, e.g., [56, 73, 79])5. 
AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUALIZATION: THE 
5DPT MODEL 
The Dimensions S and G 
From the above, it appears that the genotypic variant of 
Eysenck’s Psychoticism model has two fundamental short-
comings, which, however, are easy to repair. First, it was 
noted that a factor similar to EPQ P – or rather to Roger & 
Morris’ subfactor ‘Callousness’ [77] – must be postulated 
that, unlike Eysenck’s conceptualization of P, stands for the 
phenotypic expression of a genetically-based predisposition 
towards antisocial or ‘psychopathic’ conduct in schizophre-
                                                
5 The importance of E and N in the field of psychosis is also indicated by the 
fact that high E appears to be associated with the onset of mania [80] and 
high N with unipolar depression [81]. In addition, N describes the suscepti-
bility to neurotic illnesses [82].  
nia and related spectrum disorders. Second, the EPQ P con-
struct – or in fact low P – was found to enclose a subfactor 
‘Punctuality’, which appeared to describe one component of 
the pre-morbid personality structure that determines the 
probability of being affected by unipolar depression and, 
perhaps, by bipolar disorder. Based on these views, but also 
recognizing the lack of factor invariance and other psycho-
metric deficiencies associated with the EPQ P scale [44,83], 
we constructed two inventories – the 3DPT or Three-
Dimensional Personality Test  [44] and the 4DPT or Four-
Dimensional Personality Test [47]. In these instruments, 
scales for E and N were retained, but the P scale was re-
placed by one, respectively two scales that were called S or 
Insensitivity and G or Orderliness. These scales were found 
to be reliable, to refer to highly invariant factors, and to 
show expected relationships with several validity criteria 
[47,75]. 
The Search for a ‘Fifth’ Dimension 
With the establishment of the 4DPT model, we may say 
to have arrived at an updated version of Eysenck’s PEN 
model, consisting of the orthogonal dimensions E, N, S and 
G, of which S and G were derived on the basis of our criti-
cisms on Eysenck’s genotypic P model. Nevertheless, there 
is still one dimension postulated by Eysenck – the pheno-
typic P dimension – that has no place in the 4DPT model. 
Naturally, being a phenotypic construct, this situation makes 
sense, but because Eysenck’s normality-psychosis contin-
uum partly refers to normal personality characteristics that 
are apparently assumed to underlie, and have an intrinsic 
relationship with, psychotic symptoms, these normal person-
ality characteristics have also a genotypic or predispository 
status. Unfortunately, Eysenck nowhere presents a descrip-
tion of these normal personality traits. The only thing we 
know is that the phenotypic P dimension appears to have a 
near-zero correlation with EPQ P (see above). 
To indicate someone’s position on the normality-
psychosis continuum, use can be made of such measures as 
Eysenck’s original P scale or the O-LIFE Unusual Experi-
ences scale developed by Mason, Claridge & Jackson [84]. 
However, given the fact that for the 4DPT scales S, E, N, 
and G no items were formulated that are clearly outside the 
normal range, we are simply not interested in the use of that 
kind of scales if we want to extend the 4DPT. Moreover, if 
Eysenck’s normality-psychosis continuum exists, then there 
is every reason to only emphasize those characteristics that 
may underlie psychosis but are in fact relatively benign. So, 
the question arises which personality features, if any, may be 
selected to define a scalable trait that shares certain proper-
ties with psychosis, but that nevertheless refers only to 
higher or lower degrees of normal personality functioning. 
There are a few indications that the trait we are looking 
for must have something to do with the FFM dimension 
Openness to Experience (O). In a factor analytic study by 
Rawlings & Freeman [85], several inventories, among which 
Mason et al.’s O-LIFE and the NEO-PI-R, yielded five fac-
tors that were interpretable as Neuroticism, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experi-
ence. The here most interesting fact is that the Openness 
factor was partly defined by an – albeit modest – loading 
from the O-LIFE Unusual Experiences scale, a scale for the 
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measurement of positive schizotypy. Similar results were 
obtained in a study by Wiggins & Pincus [86]. It may be 
then that the cognitive and perceptual aberrations that are 
seen in schizotypal personality disorder and in psychosis 
might somehow relate to a high position on O. If we further 
postulate that psychosis and psychotic-like states are charac-
terized by a high degree of openness to all sorts of incoming 
stimuli, then Openness to Experience might be considered to 
denote a fundamental property, indeed bridging the cleft 
between psychosis and normality. 
From Openness to Absorption 
Unfortunately, several findings shed doubt on this con-
clusion. For instance, in Austin & Deary’s survey of correla-
tional studies, consistent FFM correlations are only apparent 
between schizotypal personality disorder and Neuroticism, 
(low) Extraversion, and (low) Agreeableness [87]. Hence, 
given our expectation that O seems likely to be useful in 
assessing the aberrant perceptions and beliefs of the schizo-
type, the studies that suggest otherwise require an explana-
tion. 
One particular helpful explanation seems provided by 
Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson & Costa [88]. Instead of 
looking at the total Openness to Experience construct, the 
prediction was formulated that only high positions on the 
NEO-PI facets O1 (Openness to Fantasy), O5 (Openness to 
Ideas), and O6 (Openness to Values) and low positions on 
O3 (Openness to Feelings) would be associated with ele-
vated scores on measures of schizotypal personality disorder. 
However, the only hypothesis that could be confirmed in 
several studies was the prediction of a positive relationship 
with O1. Although not anticipated, positive correlations with 
O2 (Openness to Aesthetics) and O3 did also emerge. Of, 
perhaps, greatest interest is an investigation by Ross, Lutz & 
Bailly executed in a sample of female and male students 
[89]. Instead of using overall scales for schizotypy or schizo-
typal personality disorder, separate scales were administered 
for the assessment of positive and negative symptoms. Of the 
six Openness facets, O1, O2, and O5 turned out to correlate 
significantly in the subgroup males with the two scales ad-
ministered for positive schizotypy. Moreover, in the sub-
group males, a significant correlation was found between O3 
and one of these scales. However, in the subgroup females, 
only O2 appeared to correlate with the two scales, whereas 
O5 was found to correlate significantly with one scale.  
From the above, it seems apparent that particularly the 
Openness facets O1, O2, and O3 may have something to do 
with – or even represent – the normal personality dimension 
we are looking for to connect normality with psychosis. Ac-
tually, however, we may go one step further by realizing that 
exactly the same three facets have been found in several 
studies to be associated with a more broadly defined dimen-
sion of normal personality functioning, namely, Openness to 
Absorbing and Self-Altering Experiences, or in short Absorp-
tion [90]. According to a study by McCrae & Costa [91], for 
instance, only the NEO-PI facet scales O1, O2, and O3 
turned out to correlate rather substantially with the Absorp-
tion scale contained in Tellegen’s Multidimensional Person-
ality Questionnaire (MPQ) [92], and not the facet scales O4, 
O5, and O6. Similar findings were obtained by Church [93]. 
A study by Glisky, Tataryn, Tobias, Kihlstrom & McConkey 
demonstrated that a joint factor analysis of the six NEO-PI 
Openness facet scales and nine subscales of the MPQ Ab-
sorption scale resulted in two factors, of which the first one 
was characterized by relatively high loadings from all Ab-
sorption subscales plus O1, O2, and O3, and the second one 
by relatively high loadings from O4, O5, and O6 [94]. 
Against this background, it seems understandable that Ab-
sorption has been found to be related to daydreaming, fan-
tasy proneness, and ratings of the importance of music and 
art to daily life [95]. 
Absorption and Eysenck’s Theory-Informed Approach 
When considering extending the 4DPT model by a ‘fifth’ 
dimension, Eysenck’s theory-informed methodology re-
quires that such a dimension must rest on a general and 
causal theory that has been tested experimentally, or that at 
least permits experimental testing. Presently, however, a 
strong nomological network for Absorption has not been 
formulated. On the other hand, several empirical findings 
exist that are consistent with the role of Absorption as a vul-
nerability factor for psychosis, or that even suggest specific 
biological mechanisms that underlie the generation of behav-
iors represented by that dimension. Thus, in hypothesizing 
that our ‘fifth’ dimension is actually Absorption, we are at 
least proceeding in a manner comparable to or consistent 
with Eysenck’s approach. 
In a study conducted by Thalbourne, Bartemucci, Delin, 
Fox & Nofi, both a clinical and a control sample were sub-
jected to Tellegen’s Absorption scale and to several invento-
ries measuring different features supposed to form part of 
Thalbourne’s Transliminality construct [96]. The term 
Transliminality refers to a set of correlated phenomena that 
are characterized by a ‘susceptibility to, and awareness of, 
large volumes of imagery, ideation and affect – these phe-
nomena being generated by subliminal, supraliminal and/or 
external input’ [96]. The Transliminality features investi-
gated in the mentioned study were paranormal beliefs and 
experiences, magical ideation, manic-like experiences, crea-
tivity, and mystical experience. Most important here is that 
the Tellegen Absorption scale emerged to correlate with 
magical ideation, which was assessed by the similarly 
termed scale of Eckblad & Chapman [97]. However, the 
remaining four facets of Transliminality were also found to 
correlate with Tellegen’s Absorption scale. This was the 
reason for Thalbourne to add the Absorption construct to the 
variables already supposed to measure Transliminality. 
Other variables, then or later on also assumed to be core con-
stituents of the Transliminality factor, are schizotypal per-
sonality, unusual experiences, fantasy proneness, dissocia-
tion, general religiosity, hallucinatory predisposition, fre-
quency of dream interpretation, hyperesthesia, and a positive 
attitude towards dream interpretation (see, e.g., [98]).  
From our perspective, not all correlations between these 
variables and Tellegen’s Absorption construct are equally 
interesting. In fact, based on the correlations between 16 
Transliminality scales (including Absorption), Thalbourne 
conducted a principal components analysis with the expecta-
tion that all variables would yield one underlying factor, in-
terpretable as Transliminality [99]. However, the analysis 
resulted in three correlated factors, that in our view (based 
on data provided by Thalbourne; Personal communication, 
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November 18, 2002) must be interpreted as Reality Changes 
(with high loadings from unusual experiences, hallucinatory 
predisposition, magical ideation, schizotypy, absorption, 
fantasy proneness and two dissociation measures), Spiritual 
Experiences (religiosity, mystical experience, and paranor-
mal belief), and Creativity (creative personality), respec-
tively. Hence, from our perspective, it is particularly the 
first-mentioned factor with its high loadings from both 
Tellegen’s Absorption scale and several measures of positive 
schizotypy that might further strengthen our confidence in 
the Absorption dimension as a variable relevant for the de-
velopment of psychotic-like and psychotic symptoms.  
Just like Thalbourne’s (intended) Transliminality con-
struct6, the factor Reality Changes combines various fea-
tures, ranging from absorption and fantasy proneness, which 
represent more or less normal personality variations, to psy-
chotic-like features, and, extending this range, probably even 
to psychotic characteristics. Of course, we may regard all 
facets of Reality Changes to define one and the same do-
main, without paying attention to the situation that the vari-
ous facets appear to be phenotypically different. In doing so, 
we may follow Watson who has noted that individual differ-
ences in schizotypal, dissociative and sleep experiences all 
seem to ‘reflect the ease with which a person can pass be-
tween different states of consciousness’ [100]. We may even 
present a psychophysiological explanation of this greater 
permeability by speculating about a hyperconnectivity be-
tween temporal-limbic structures and sensory association 
cortices [101] or about the possibility, mentioned by 
McCreery [102], that Stage 1 sleep phenomena (and not 
REM sleep phenomena), under the influence of hy-
perarousal, briefly intrude into waking consciousness. Evi-
dence, discussed by Ott, Reuter, Hennig & Vaitl, also sug-
gests a common biological basis of absorption and positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia [103]. 
Instead of the common factor, the separate facets of Real-
ity Changes may also be given attention. In this respect, it is 
particularly the Absorption dimension that takes a special 
place. Unlike, for instance, magical ideation, Absorption is 
defined by Tellegen [104] as a capacity to enter dissociative 
and other phantasy-based experiences; therefore, this person-
ality dimension seems to initiate other manifestations of Re-
ality Changes. This causative view on Absorption fits well 
with Allen & Coyne’s continuum of detachment that was 
introduced to describe several stages in the progression to 
psychosis in patients suffering from complex trauma-related 
disorders [105]. On this continuum, Absorption is assumed 
to lead to depersonalization and derealization (dissociative 
detachment), and may finally result in an inward flight into a 
world of traumatic images and affects, ‘with all the earmarks 
of psychotic experience’. Recent research by Van Kampen, 
Maurer, An der Heiden & Häfner [106], testing Van 
Kampen’s [53] SSQ model of prodromal unfolding in a 
sample of first-episode schizophrenic patients, corroborates 
this view in that it could demonstrate that four symptoms 
indicative of a process of progressive estrangement on Allen 
& Coyne’s detachment continuum had their mean times of 
                                                
6 Actually, a new set of 9 facets (also embracing absorption) was finally 
proposed by Thalbourne that led to the extraction of only one Transliminal-
ity factor [99]. 
onset associated with gradually higher positions on a stan-
dardized continuum that reflects proportion of total pro-
drome time.  
Summarizing the above, we may conclude that whereas 
the various manifestations of Reality Changes define a 
common factor that probably rests on enhanced boundary 
permeability (and on the above-mentioned biological factors 
that seem to explain this greater permeability), only Absorp-
tion plays a causative role with respect to the emergence of 
other features related to this factor. Hence, Absorption seems 
the trait we are looking for to connect normality with psy-
chosis and to delineate the normal pole of Eysenck’s normal-
ity-psychosis continuum. However, unlike Eysenck’s pheno-
typic claim for P (see above), a high score on Absorption 
does not necessarily indicate the presence of psychosis. It is 
only if we regard Absorption as a weak form of impaired 
reality testing, and derealization, depersonalization, psy-
chotic-like and psychotic symptoms gradually more serious 
manifestations of it, that we may speak of a continuum that 
‘goes all the way from the perfectly normal, rational to the 
completely insane, psychotic individual’ [61]. It is clear, 
however, that impaired reality testing – given its phenotypi-
cally different manifestations – can not be regarded a single 
scalable quality on which individuals differ from each other 
by having higher or lower degrees of it. So, after all, we 
must arrive at the conclusion that Eysenck’s phenotypic P 
continuum can only be kept upright in terms of a nonscalable 
attribute (impaired reality testing) but not if we want to sin-
gle out the personality features (Absorption) which lie at the 
normal extreme of that continuum. 
The Five-Dimensional Personality Test 
Given the conclusion that is seems possible to extend the 
4DPT with a scale to assess Absorption (A), the 5DPT or 
Five-Dimensional Personality Test was constructed. Details 
about its development, as well as information about the psy-
chometrics and validity of the 5DPT is and will be presented 
elsewhere [107-111], as this paper has only the intention to 
give a theory-informed account of the underlying 5DPT 
model as an update of Eysenck’s personality scheme. Suffice 
here to say that the 5DPT scales were found to intercorrelate 
almost zero, to rest on factors that are highly invariant with 
respect to various sample parameters7, to show adequate test-
retest and Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities, and to exhibit pat-
terns of correlates that support both the concurrent and con-
struct validity of the scales. It was shown, for instance, that 
the 5DPT A scale correlated well with several measures that 
represent both the Transliminality factor Reality Changes 
and Allen and Coyne’s detachment continuum. Moreover, 
the 5DPT scales for N, S, and A correlated positively, and 
5DPT E negatively with Van Kampen’s Schizotypic Syn-
drome Questionnaire, which is in agreement with clinical 
descriptions of the features that typify schizoid, schizotypal 
and pre-schizophrenic individuals [75]. Also, as expected, 
high N, S, and G scores and low E scores turned out to char-
acterize individuals with high positions on the DAPP-BQ 
and DAPP-SF personality disorder dimensions Emotional 
                                                
7 High congruence values were also obtained after comparing the factor 
structures of the American-English (Dr. Coolidge; University of Colorado, 
USA) and Italian (Dr. San Martini; University of Rome, Italy) translations 
of the 5DPT with the original Dutch instrument.  
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Dysregulation, Dissocial, Compulsivity, and Inhibition, re-
spectively, as well as on their lower-order factors [110,111]. 
Interestingly, the theory-informed 5DPT scales were also 
found to correlate rather substantially with the NEO-FFI 
[107] and HEXACO-Personality Inventory scales [109], thus 
additionally demonstrating the comprehensiveness of the 
5DPT model from a lexical point of view.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The question may arise whether it is possible to extend 
the 5DPT model with other theory-informed susceptibility 
dimensions. However, if dimensions from other theoretical 
personality systems are considered, like Cloninger’s psycho-
biological temperament and character model (e.g., [112]), the 
proposed dimensions appear to have much in common with 
both the Eysenck dimensions and the FFM factors [113]. As 
the 5DPT model shows a rather close correspondence with 
the Five Factor Model [107], and the FFM or Big Five fac-
tors Agreeableness and Conscientiou-sness negatively relate 
to P [28,30], it seems almost certain that a similar overlap 
will also appear if the Cloninger scales are correlated with 
the 5DPT. Comparable results can be expected for other the-
ory-based systems that relate to the PEN and FFM models, 
like Zuckerman’s Alternative Five [114]. Conceptually, we 
may also infer relationships between the dimensions cogni-
tive/perceptual organization, impulsivity/aggression, affec-
tive instability, and anxiety/inhibition in Siever & Davis’ 
psychobiological model and the 5DPT. These associations 
are interesting as the dimensions in this model were explic-
itly postulated to span the DSM-III-R Axis 1 and Axis II 
disorders [115]. Given the fact that the 5DPT was also found 
to correlate with the six dimensions of the HEXACO-PI 
[109], we may put the question whether it is possible to ex-
tend the 5DPT with one or more lexically-based dimensions 
that are of clinical interest (provided, of course, that a no-
mological network can be established). However, with re-
spect to the issue whether lexical personality factors may be 
found beyond the Big Five, the literature seems divided. On 
the one side, most present-day researchers adhere to a ver-
sion of the prevailing Big Five model; on the other, several 
six-factor representations, including the HEXACO model, 
and even models embracing seven or more factors have been 
propagated [31,116]. These additional dimensions are, for 
instance, Risk-Taking [117], Spirituality [118], and Positive 
and Negative Valence [116]. Though some of these dimen-
sions have been reported more than once [119], the results 
are far from consistent. Furthermore, it is sometimes stated 
that at least some additional factors may be better conceptu-
alized as maladaptive variants of existing Big Five dimen-
sions [120]. With respect to the HEXACO-PI, we must also 
state that the dimensions Honesty and Agreeableness were 
found to be subfactors of 5DPT Insensitivity, mimicking the 
situation regarding P and the Big Five dimensions Agree-
ableness and Conscientiousness. Of course, from the per-
spective of the HEXACO model, the maintenance of our 
theory-based S dimension would logically indicate the ne-
cessity of extending the 5DPT with a ‘sixth’ orthogonal fac-
tor that relates to the personality features that have a positive 
loading on HEXACO Agreeableness in combination with a 
negative loading on HEXACO Honesty and vice versa. 
However, consulting the six-factor structure of personality-
descriptive adjectives that emerged in Ashton et al.’s study 
[31] – the data were kindly provided by De Vries; Personal 
communication, January 6, 2009 – no adjectives were found 
that showed this pattern of loadings. With these objections, 
we regard it as unfeasible to choose for any additional di-
mension, even if a certain factor, like for instance Risk-
Taking, appears to show clinical relevance. At least for the 
time being, our conclusion must be that the theory-informed 
5DPT model which comprises the vulnerability factors S, E, 
N, G, and A suffices as a psychopathology-related personal-
ity model. With each 5DPT dimension (eventually) embed-
ded in a strong nomological network that relates to findings 
in genetics, physiology, neuropsychology, learning theory, 
etc., the 5DPT model might be expected to offer an adequate 
and integrated explanatory framework for studying the fre-
quency and patterns of overlap between personality and psy-
chopathology. 
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